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Abstract 
We study whether raising instructional time can crowd out student pro-social behaviour. To this end, we 
exploit a large educational reform in Germany that has raised weekly instructional hours for high school 
students by 12.5% as a quasi-natural experiment. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that this 
rise has a negative and sizeable effect on volunteering, both at the intensive and at the extensive margin. It 
also affects political interest. There is no similar crowding out of scholastic involvement, but no 
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in intensity of instruction, and to be temporary only. Robustness checks, including placebo tests and triple 
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1. Introduction
A growing body of empirical literature documents the importance of instructional time for stu-
dent learning and performance (Patall et al., 2010). Raising instructional time – the allocated
number of hours per year that students spend in formal classroom settings – is often found to
have positive effects on cognitive skills such as maths and language ability (Bellei, 2009; Cortes
and Goodman, 2014; Taylor, 2014), as well as standardised maths, reading, and scientific liter-
acy test scores (Andrietti, 2016; Cattaneo et al., 2016; Huebener et al., 2017).1 Differences in
instructional time between countries are also found to account for some of the observed inter-
national gaps in student achievement (Lavy, 2015; Woessmann, 2003).2 Thus, despite being a
relative costly input into the educational production function, raising instructional time features
high on the policy agenda in many countries (OECD, 2016). Yet, outcomes other than student
learning and achievement have not been broadly studied (Patall et al., 2010), and particularly
little is known about how changes in instructional time might influence student leisure activities
and behaviours. Can raising instructional time have hidden costs by – unintentionally – crowd-
ing out student leisure activities and behaviours that parents, educators, and policy-makers alike
would otherwise consider worth promoting?
In this paper, we are interested in a particular type of student behaviour: pro-social be-
haviour, defined as voluntary behaviour intended to benefit one or more individuals other than
oneself (Eisenberg et al., 2013). This type of behaviour can cover a broad range of actions
such as helping, sharing, and other forms of cooperation (Batson and Powell, 2003), and is dis-
tinct from altruism in that it is not purely motivated by increasing another individual’s welfare,
but can be motivated by, for example, empathy, reciprocity, or self-image (Evren and Minardi,
2017). Pro-social behaviour, and in particular volunteering, is linked to various positive out-
comes: at the societal level, it can help build social capital through fostering cooperation and
trust and through promoting citizenship (Putnam, 2000), and social capital is linked to higher
levels of subjective well-being in societies (Helliwell et al., 2011); at the individual level, it
is found to nurture important cognitive and non-cognitive skills that can improve individual
1There is growing evidence that the effect of raising instructional time on student learning and performance is
heterogeneous, and in particular, that higher-performing students tend to benefit relatively more (Cattaneo et al.,
2016; Huebener et al., 2017).
2The importance of instructional time for student achievement varies between educational systems, and in
particular, between developed and developing countries (Woessmann, 2016), pointing towards potentially impor-
tant complementarities in educational production, for example, between instructional time and teacher quality or
effective classroom management techniques (Rivkin and Schiman, 2015).
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labour market outcomes, to have positive physical and mental health benefits, and to raise sub-
jective well-being over and beyond other benefits (Wilson and Musick, 2012), as confirmed
in both observational (Binder and Freytag, 2013; Borgnonovi, 2008; Meier and Stutzer, 2008)
and experimental studies (Dunn et al., 2008; Aknin et al., 2008). Specifically for youth, there is
evidence that volunteering from an early age on enhances psychological development by rais-
ing self-esteem and self-confidence and by discouraging risky behaviours (Hart et al., 2007;
Wilson and Musick, 2012).
To study the effect of raising instructional time on student pro-social behaviour, we exploit
a large educational reform in Germany as a quasi-natural experiment: starting with school
cohorts in the early 2000s, the number of school years required to obtain the university entrance
qualification has been reduced from 13 to 12. In Germany, secondary education, which is
compulsory until the age of 16, is tripartite: after (mostly) four years of joint primary education,
students are tracked into different school types according to their abilities: lower, intermediate,
or upper track schools.3 Only the upper track leads to the university entrance qualification, and
the reform has reduced the number of school years in this particular track – hereafter simply
referred to as high school – from nine to eight. It aimed at reducing the graduation age of high
school students, which was high in international comparison, to enable an earlier entry into the
labour market. This, in turn, aimed at counteracting demographic change, especially an eroding
contributor base and a shortage of skilled labour.
This reform – commonly referred to as ”G8”, where ”G” refers to high schools (Gymnasien)
and ”8” to the new, reduced number of school years (as opposed to the old ”G9” system) – has
two features that make it particularly interesting for us: first, the overall curriculum and thus
total instructional time required to obtain the university entrance qualification has not changed,
which, in turn, has lead to a 12.5% rise in weekly instructional hours across all subjects plus
a rise in accompanying coursework.4 Importantly, there have been no changes to the taught
curriculum that target pro-social behaviour. In terms of an educational production function,
this means that only instructional time has changed, whereas other inputs such as class size, in-
3Some federal states offer schools that combine the lower and intermediate track, or comprehensive schools or
alternative school types that postpone tracking.
4Starting from the fifth grade (the first year of secondary education), students generally have to complete
at least 265 year-week hours before being allowed to take the university entrance qualification exam (Standing
Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs, 2016). Thus, average instructional hours per year
increased from 1,051 to 1,184, compared to 950 in upper secondary education in England and 1,038 in the US
(OECD, 2014). The rise in weekly instructional hours can be calculated as (((265/(8))/(265/(9)))−1)×100.
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structional materials, and teacher quality have not been changed as a result of the reform. This
allows us to estimate the ”pure” effect of raising instructional time on student pro-social be-
haviour, excluding potentially confounding changes to the educational system that are typically
accompanied by similar reforms. Second, since education in Germany is the responsibility of
the 16 federal states, there has been a staggered implementation of the reform: while some
federal states implemented it as early as 2001 (Saarland), others waited until 2007 (Schleswig-
Holstein); yet others have never fully implemented it (Rhineland-Palatine), or as in case of
Saxony and Thuringia, have always required only 12 school years to obtain the university en-
trance qualification (Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs,
2016). This allows the estimation of the causal effect of raising instructional time on student
pro-social behaviour by exploiting variation in the implementation of the reform.
Figure A.1 shows this variation across federal states and school cohorts (highlighted in
different shades of gold). It also shows the share of students in the different tracks (highlighted
in different shades of red): in school year 2013/14, of 5,187,960 students in total, 2,329,990
(45%) were in the upper track; with few exceptions, they made up the largest share of students
in each federal state.
Using survey data on youth and adolescents from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP) and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the 12.5% rise in weekly instruc-
tional hours significantly crowds out student pro-social behaviour: it has a negative and sizeable
effect on volunteering, decreasing the likelihood to volunteer at least once a month by about six
percentage points. Given that almost 34 percent of students report to volunteer at least monthly,
this amounts to a decrease of about 19 percent in this share. In other words, the rise in instruc-
tional time leads almost every fifth student to change her behaviour from volunteering at least
monthly to volunteering less often or not at all. This change is primarily driven by students who
report to volunteer on a weekly basis, and it affects both the intensive and extensive margin of
volunteering: while two thirds of the students cut back on their activities, the other third give
them up completely. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to cut back on
their activities. We find no similar crowding out of scholastic involvement, but no substitu-
tion either. Interestingly, we find that the rise in instructional time has a differential impact on
student political interest: it leads to a depolarisation at both ends of the spectrum, decreasing
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the share of students who report to be at least fairly interested in politics while at the same
time decreasing the share that report to be not interested at all. The size of these changes is
very strong: every third student switches category. Impacts seem to be driven by a reduction in
available leisure time as opposed to a rise in intensity of instruction, and to be temporary only.
The results are robust to a different model specification, time trends, and seasonal variation;
selection and implementation; triple differencing, and potentially confounding other reforms
that are implemented during the observation period. They also withstand a series of placebo
tests.
This finding is significant for several reasons: first, in the given context, it is significant be-
cause of the sheer number of students affected. In Germany, in school year 2013/14 alone, the
reform affected 2,329,990 high school students, about half of the entire student population in
secondary education (Federal Statistical Office, 2016b). Second, it is significant because of the
important role pro-social behaviour, and in particular volunteering, plays, both for individuals,
as described above, and for society at large: the OECD estimates the economic value of vol-
unteering for Germany in 2013 to be around USD 117.6 billion or 3.3% of real GDP (OECD,
2015), roughly comparable to the UK and the US. From a time use perspective, the average
German citizen spends about seven minutes per day volunteering, compared to about eight
minutes per day for the average US citizen (OECD, 2011). Finally, to the extent that students
from disadvantaged backgrounds are disproportionally affected, the decrease in volunteering
for these groups might further increase educational inequalities, and thus inequalities in later
life outcomes.
We contribute to two strands of literature: first, we contribute to the economic literature
on the external, non-monetary effect of education on civic engagement, which focuses on the
effect of years of education on predominantly political interest, information, and participation
(Dee, 2004; Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Milligan et al., 2004; Pelkonen, 2012; Siedler, 2010),
as well as reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Kosse et al., 2014).5 Here, the study most
closely related to ours is Gibson (2001): the author uses a sample of twins to hold unobservable
family characteristics constant, showing that more years of education are associated with a
lower probability of volunteering and supply of volunteer hours. We complement this study
by focusing on instructional time rather than amount of instruction.6 Second, we contribute
5See Lochner (2011) and Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011) for reviews.
6Next to this literature in economics stands a large body of literature in political science on the relationship
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to the literature on instructional time (Bellei, 2009; Cortes and Goodman, 2014; Cortes et al.,
2015; Herrmann and Rockoff, 2012; Taylor, 2014), and in particular, to the stream that exploits
the ”G8” reform as a source of exogenous variation: since the first data became available, the
reform has been used – due to its features – as a laboratory for empirical research in educational
economics. The more sophisticated studies use difference-in-differences designs that exploit
variation in its implementation across federal states and school cohorts; they examine its effects
on graduation age, grade repetition, and graduation rates (Huebener and Marcus, 2015), post-
secondary educational choices (Meyer et al., 2015), performance (Andrietti, 2016; Homuth,
2012; Huebener et al., 2017), health (Quis and Reif, 2017), and well-being (Quis, 2015).7 Here,
the studies that are methodologically most closely related to ours are Dahmann and Anger
(2014) and Dahmann (2017): we use the same dataset and a similar specification as these
authors, who show that the reform affects personality traits, and to some extent, cognitive
skills. So far, the potentially negative effects on leisure activities of youth and adolescents
have played only a minor role relative to educational outcomes, although this point has sparked
considerable controversy amongst students, parents, and educators alike (see, for example,
Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (2010) for a feature), and continues to do so today. The only academic
study so far that has looked at leisure activities of youth and adolescents is Meyer and Thomsen
(2015): the authors use self-collected cross-section data on students from the double graduation
cohort (which may be subject to implementation effects) in the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt
two years after graduation, showing that students in this cohort and state indeed felt more
pressured and tended to spend less time on leisure activities such as jobbing or volunteering.
More generally, the impact of instructional time on student pro-social behaviour has received
little attention so far.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data used in the empir-
ical analysis, Section 3 the empirical model and identification strategy. The results, including
robustness checks, are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses them against the background
of recent trends in the educational sector, and gives policy implications.
between education and political participation, especially voter turnout. See, for example, Henderson and Chatfield
(2011), Hillygus (2005), Persson (2014), and Sondheimer and Green (2010), to name just a few.
7Early studies relied mostly on double graduation cohorts, often analysed within a single federal state (see
Bu¨ttner and Thomsen (2015) or (Thiel et al., 2014), for example). These cohorts, however, may be subject to
implementation effects.
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2. Data
2.1. German Socio-Economic Panel Study
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)8 is a representative panel of private house-
holds in Germany. It has been conducted annually since 1984, and includes almost 30,000
individuals in more than 11,000 households in its current wave. The SOEP provides rich infor-
mation on all household members, covering Germans living in the old and new federal states,
foreigners, and recent immigrants (Wagner et al., 2007, 2008). Most importantly, it provides
information on the volunteering, scholastic involvement, and political interest of youth and
adolescents, as well as on their demographic, educational, and parental household characteris-
tics.
During fieldwork, typically, two types of questionnaires are administered: an individual
questionnaire is filled out by each household member aged 18 and above; a separate household
questionnaire is filled out by the household head. The former covers personal characteristics
such as education, leisure activities, and attitudes, the latter household and neighbourhood char-
acteristics that apply to all household members equally. Moreover, since 2000, a separate youth
questionnaire including both prospective and retrospective items on childhood and schooling
is administered to youth in the year in which they turn 17. This is when individuals enter the
SOEP at the earliest. If they enter at a later point in time, they are administered – in addition to
the individual questionnaire – a supplementary biography questionnaire that includes most of
the items of the youth questionnaire in order to complement missing information.
The youth questionnaire is our main data source: it includes items on the volunteering,
scholastic involvement, and political interest of youth annually from 2006 onwards. To increase
sample size, we complement these data with data on adolescents from the individual question-
naire, which includes the same items on volunteering biannually from 2001 and on political
interest biannually from 2000 onwards (with few exceptions). The supplementary biography
questionnaire complements items on scholastic involvement.9 The SOEP also provides readily
usable, generated items on educational trajectories of respondents, including the year and fed-
eral state in which they started school, the type of school they are currently attending, and in
8Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2015, version 32, SOEP, 2016, DOI: 10.5684/soep.v32
9In unreported robustness checks, we account for between-survey differences at any point in time by including
a dummy variable for the respective survey: the results remain robust, and are available upon request. Moreover,
we account for within-survey differences over time by routinely controlling for school cohorts.
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case they have already graduated, the year and federal state in which they have graduated, as
well as the degree they have obtained. In case the year or state of school enrolment is missing,
we impute it using their date of birth or state of residence, respectively.10 If we have multiple
observations of the same individual, we only include the observation at the youngest age.
We restrict our sample to the years 2000 to 2015, and to individuals aged 17 to 20 in order
to create a homogeneous age group and avoid confounding effects associated with entrance
into tertiary education. We focus only on high school students and graduates, as only those
have been affected by the reform. In doing so, we omit students from comprehensive schools:
as we cannot clearly identify whether these students are attending or graduated from the aca-
demic track, we take a conservative approach and omit them altogether. Moreover, we omit all
individuals from federal states where the reform has never been implemented, or during years
in which it has been implemented only partially. Finally, we omit all individuals with missing
observations on outcomes and covariates. Depending on how many observations on outcomes
are available, this gives us a sample of 2,240 students for volunteering, 1,958 for scholastic
involvement, and 2,536 for political interest.11
Outcomes
Volunteering. We select volunteering as our main outcome for pro-social behaviour. The indi-
cator is obtained from a single-item five-point Likert scale that asks respondents “How often do
you do volunteer work in clubs or social services during free time?”. Possible answers include
“daily” (about 6% of respondents), “every week” (16%), “every month” (12%), “less often”
(29%), and “never” (37%). We create a binary indicator that equals one if respondents volun-
teer at least once a month, that is, if they volunteer daily, weekly, or monthly, and zero else.
About 34% of respondents do so.12
10When benchmarking the imputed values with the original ones, we find that they match in about 99% of cases
for the state and 66% of cases for the year of school enrolment. Obviously, for the latter, there is some discretion
on side of parents (we account for differences in cut-off dates for school enrolment across states and over time): if
we assume that parents have a tendency to redshirt, that is, to strategically postpone school enrolment in order to
provide their children with educational advantages due to relative and absolute maturity (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006;
Black et al., 2011), their children are correctly allocated to the treatment group. Enrolling in school prematurely,
on the contrary, is very rare in Germany.
11If not stated otherwise, descriptive statistics are given on the sample for volunteering.
12In our baseline specification, we use a binary indicator because it splits the share of students who volunteer
at least once a month, less often, and never into approximately equal shares. In extended specifications, at a
later point, we will also use binary indicators for each category (see Figure A.8): as we shall see, these turn out
insignificant, as the reform shifts the entire volunteering distribution.
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Figure A.2 shows the development of this outcome over the observation period. The x-
axis denotes the interview year, and the y-axis the fitted annual mean, covariate adjusted for
observables described in Sub-Section 2.1.
We can see that, over the past decade, there has been an initial rise in the share of students
who volunteer at least once a month, up until the year 2005, whereafter this share started to
decline until it reached again its initial value in the year 2015.13
As this indicator is framed in such a way as to refer to activities outside school, we select
various ways of scholastic involvement as additional outcomes to cover activities inside, in line
with a broad definition of pro-social behaviour. The respective indicators are obtained from
a battery of binary items that asks respondents “Besides normal classes, there are also other
ways to get involved in school. Have you ever – before or right now – been involved in one or
more of the following ways?” Possible answers include “student representative” (about 3% of
respondents), “class representative” (42%), “school magazine” (10%), “drama or dance group”
(20%), “choir or orchestra” (33%), “sports group” (27%), “other voluntary group” (37%), and
“none” (19%). We create a binary indicator for each activity that equals one if respondents
have ever been engaged in it, and zero else.
Political Interest. Pro-social behaviour is voluntary behaviour intended to benefit one or more
individuals other than oneself (Eisenberg et al., 2013), and is distinct from altruism in that it is
not purely motivated by increasing another individual’s welfare, but can be motivated by, for
example, empathy, reciprocity, or self-image. We adopt a broad definition of pro-sociality here,
and are also interested in political behaviour and participation, which can (but, of course, does
not necessarily have to) be motivated by the willingness to benefit specific groups of society or
society as a whole.
Apart from items on voting intentions in federal elections, the SOEP does not include spe-
cific items on political behaviour, for example, on membership in political parties or partici-
pation in youth organisations.14 However, it regularly asks respondents about their degree of
13Figure W.1 in the Web Appendix shows the development of volunteering for students in the lower and inter-
mediate track: compared to those in the upper track, these students tend to volunteer less. The rise in the share that
volunteers at least once a month prolonged much longer, up until the year 2009, whereafter it started to decline.
14As federal elections (normally) happen only once every four years, the sample size is not large enough to
analyse these items. The SOEP also asks respondents whether they lean towards a specific party, and if so,
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interest in politics more generally. As interest has long been seen as a necessary condition for
subsequent behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), we select political interest as outcome to
proxy for political behaviour. The indicator is obtained from a single-item four-point Likert
scale that asks respondents “Generally speaking, how much are you interested in politics?”.
Possible answers include “very much” (about 6% of respondents), “much” (26%), ”not so
much” (52%), and “not at all” (15%). We create a binary indicator for each of these categories.
Subjective Well-Being. As our final outcome, we select the self-reported life satisfaction of
students, an evaluative measure of subjective well-being. To be clear, we are not interested
in the impact of the reform on student subjective well-being per se: this has been researched
elsewhere, and our focus is pro-social behaviour. We will, however, exploit this indicator to
shed some more light on whether the impact of the reform on pro-social behaviour is driven
by a reduction in available leisure time, or alternatively, by a rise in intensity of instruction.
The indicator is obtained from an eleven-point single-item Likert scale that asks respondents
“How satisfied are you currently, all in all, with your life?”. Possible answers range from “0”
(completely dissatisfied) to “10” (completely satisfied), with a mean of 7.8, suggesting that
students are quite happy with their lives.
Covariates
We routinely control for age and whether a student has graduated in all our regressions. The
mean age of students is 17.5, and only 4% of them have already graduated. Moreover, in our
preferred specification, we control for a rich set of other demographic and parental household
characteristics. These include gender (about 53% of students are female), migration back-
ground (about 20% have a migration background, either direct or indirect), and place of resi-
dence (about 13% live in East Germany and 28% live in rural areas). When it comes to their
parents, about 52% of students have at least one parent with a tertiary degree, 12% have a par-
ent that is a blue-collar worker, and 64% have a parent that works full time. Finally, about 4%
of students are risen by a single parent, and about 17% are the only child. The average number
of children in the household is 2.4. See Table W.1 in the Web Appendix for more descriptive
statistics.
towards which party they lean and to what extent. As there is no a priori reason to believe that an increase in
instructional time changes political orientation, we do not analyse these items.
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3. Empirical Strategy
To investigate whether raising instructional time can crowd out pro-social behaviour, we exploit
the recent educational reform in Germany that reduced the number of school years required to
obtain the university entrance qualification as a quasi-natural experiment. Specifically, we set
up a difference-in-differences design that exploits variation in the implementation of the reform
across federal states and school cohorts: students are allocated to the treatment group if they
belong to a school cohort in a federal state which was affected by the reform (or, in other words,
if they enrolled in the year in which the reform was implemented or any year thereafter in the
respective federal state), and to the control group else. Thus, students in the treatment group
are exposed to more weekly instructional hours of, on average, 12.5% plus accompanying
coursework than those in the control group. For both groups, however, the taught curriculum
is the same. From 2,240 students in our sample on volunteering, 994 are in the treatment and
1,246 are in the control group; for scholastic involvement, these are 936 and 1,022 out of 1,958
students; for political interest 1,000 and 1,536 out of 2,536; and for subjective well-being 1,011
and 1,533 out of 2,544. Table W.2 in the Web Appendix exemplary shows the distribution of
students by age in treatment and control group for volunteering over time.
3.1. Regression Equation
We employ linear probability models, which are estimated using ordinary least squares with ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the federal state level.15 More specifically, following Dahmann
and Anger (2014) and Dahmann (2017), we use the following specification:
yisc,(17−20) = β0 +β1Re f ormsc+β
′
2Xisc,(17−20)+
+
16
∑
s=1
γsStates+
14
∑
c=1
δcCohortc+ εisc,(17−20) (1)
where y is the pro-social behaviour of student i in federal state s and school cohort c, mea-
sured at age 17 to 20; Reform is a dummy variable that equals one if the student belongs to a
15In our preferred specification, less than 1% of predicted values lie outside the [0;1] interval. Moreover, the
results are similar when using a probit model, as shown in Table A.6. Out-of-sample prediction, therefore, seems
to be less of an issue. Finally, the results remain the same when using weighted regressions and bootstrapped
standard errors. See Table W.6 in the Web Appendix for these results.
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school cohort in a federal state which was affected by the reform, and zero else; and X is a vec-
tor of controls, including demographic, educational, and parental household characteristics. We
routinely include a full set of federal state and school cohort dummy variables.16 Our regressor
of interest is β1, which captures the reform effect. It can be interpreted as the average treatment
effect on the treated, and is causal if the identifying assumptions described in Sub-Section 3.2
hold.
This difference-in-differences design has two features. First, it is generalised in the sense
that treatment can occur at different points in time for different individuals. In fact, at any point
in time over the observation period, we compare students who are affected by the reform with
those who are not (yet) affected.17 Thus, towards the beginning of the observation period, the
treatment group is relatively small, and as the reform gradually fades in, it increases as more
and more observations on affected students become available, and vice versa for the control
group. Second, this difference-in-differences design is pseudo in the sense that we only observe
each student once. This is due to the fact that individuals enter the SOEP in the year in which
they turn 17 at the earliest.18 In other words, at the point of the first interview, students are
near school completion, or even shortly thereafter. As a consequence, we cannot observe their
pre-treatment outcomes, which would have had to be recorded prior to enrolment.19
This difference-in-differences design imposes stronger identifying assumptions than a con-
ventional one. For example, as we do not observe the same individuals over time but compare
different individuals at the same points in time, we cannot readily net out unobserved hetero-
geneity amongst individuals by including individual fixed effects; rather, in case there is unob-
served heterogeneity, we have to assume that there is a balance in unobservable characteristics
between treatment and control group, and that this balance remains constant over time (this is
sometime referred to as bias stability) (Heckman et al., 2009). In Sub-Section 3.2 we provide
16We also routinely include controls for sub-samples, as the SOEP consists of 16 random samples, which partly
focus on different population strata.
17As a robustness check, in Sub-Section 4.2, we implement a triple differencing design which exploits the fact
that the reform affected only students in the upper track by employing students in the other tracks as a clean control
group.
18The SOEP also includes several mother-child questionnaires, which have been administered since 2003. How-
ever, these questionnaires, which are highly age-specific and cover the age span from birth to 10, are completed by
the mother and do not include the items that are relevant for this study. A separate student questionnaire, covering
ages 11 and 12, has been administered since 2014 only (and does not include these items either).
19Strictly speaking, even if we would observe their pre-treatment outcomes, it is questionable whether we could
use them effectively: the kind of pro-social behaviour we are interested in plays a relatively minor role prior to
age 12.
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evidence that, although our identifying assumptions are stronger, they are likely to hold.
3.2. Identification
Our main identifying assumption is that, in the absence of treatment, the pro-social behaviour
of students in the treatment group would have followed the same time trend as that of students
in the control group. Although this common trend assumption is not formally testable as the
counterfactual is not observable, in Sub-Sections 3.2 and 3.2, we provide evidence that it is
likely to hold.20
Balancing on Observables
The first piece of evidence comes from Table A.1: it shows the means of all covariates, overall
and separately for treatment and control group, along with their scale-free normalised differ-
ences. Here, covariate imbalance between treatment and control group could indicate a devia-
tion from a common time trend.
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) suggest that a normalised difference above 0.25 indicates 
covariate imbalance. This is not the case for most of our covariates: only the age is above the 
threshold, and whether a student has graduated comes close. This is no surprise, though, given 
that the reform explicitly aimed at reducing the number of school years, thus indirectly reducing 
the graduation age. In fact, Huebener and Marcus (2015) estimate that the reform decreased 
the graduation age by about 10 months. Thus, we conclude that the sample is well-balanced on 
observables, and therefore most likely on unobservables as well. Finally, we routinely control
20Implicitly, we also require ignorability and the stable unit treatment value assumption to hold: the former
implies that treatment assignment is independent of the outcome, the latter that whether a student is treated or
not should not depend on the outcome of another student. Both are likely to be true: the rise in instructional
time for a student does not depend on the amount of volunteering of that student, neither does it depend on the
amount of volunteering of another student. Moreover, there should be no variation in treatment intensity between
students. Again, this is likely to be true as the reform aimed at reducing the number of school years only while
holding everything else constant. For the vast majority of students in the first school cohorts affected, the resulting
rise in instructional time was present from the point of enrolment onwards. Only students in the federal states of
Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania had already started school when the reform was implemented.
In fact, these students were in grades seven to nine, in which some schools allocated a disproportionally higher
share of the overall rise in instructional time, potentially yielding a different treatment intensity for these students.
In Sub-Section 4.2, we explore this possibility in more detail.
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for age and whether a student has graduated in all our regressions in order to rule out any age
and graduation effects.21
Graphical Evidence
Next, we take a closer look at how volunteering, our main variable of interest, evolves over time.
Figure A.3 is constructed similarly as Figure A.2: it shows the development of volunteering
over the observation period. The x-axis denotes the interview year. Different from Figure A.2,
there are now two y-axes: the left y-axis denotes the fitted annual mean, covariate adjusted
for observables, whereas the right y-axis denotes the percentage of the interviewed who were
treated. The vertical line marks the interview year before the first observations of the treated
become available.
It is clearly visible that the vertical line marks a structural break, dividing the observation
period into two: using local-mean polynomial smoothing, we can see that there is a clear
upwards trend in volunteering in the first half of the observation period, whereas in the second,
this trend is reversed. Moreover, the trend reversal coincides with an increasing share of the
treated amongst the interviewed.
Figure A.4 takes Figure A.3 one step further: it decomposes, in the second half of the
observation period, the overall mean into that of the treatment and control group, respectively.
It also plots – in addition to that of the overall mean – the polynomial fit of the control group
mean.22
We can make three observations. First, when focusing on the control group mean only, it
becomes clear that part of the trend reversal in volunteering probably would have come about
in the absence of the reform: the polynomial fit of the control group mean tilts downwards
irrespective of whether the share of the treated amongst the interviewed increases.23 Second,
21Note that covariance imbalance between treatment and control group would not necessarily be a threat to
our identification strategy: we control for a rich set of time-varying observables in our preferred specification.
Moreover, including federal state and school cohort dummy variables nets out systematic differences in both
time-invariant observables and unobservables between federal states and school cohorts, respectively.
22See Figure W.2 in the Web Appendix for a similar illustration of political interest.
23This also raises the question to what extent the identified reform effect is driven by time trends. In Sub-Section
4.2, we explore this possibility in more detail.
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the treatment group mean is systematically lower than the control group mean, and as the share
of the treated amongst the interviewed increases, the difference between the polynomial fit of
the overall and that of the control group mean increases as well. This is already suggestive that
part of the trend reversal in volunteering is indeed driven by the reform; in our regressions, we
are measuring the mean difference between the control group and the treatment group mean in
the second half of the observation period. Finally, important for identification, the treatment
group mean, when fading in, evolves in parallel to the control group mean, when fading out.
This is suggestive of a common trend between treatment and control group.
To illustrate this common trend in more detail, we plot the overall mean for different federal
states that implemented the reform quite late during the observation period. Figures A.5 and
A.6 are constructed similarly to Figure A.3: the former, Figure A.5, shows the overall mean
for two groups of states in which the first observations of the treated become available in the
same interview year, pooled together (the first group, labelled “Gr. 1”, includes the states of
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse, and Lower Saxony; the second group, labelled
“Gr. 2”, includes the states of Berlin, Brandenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein). The latter, Figure
A.6, shows them separately for two large area states in which this is not the case (the first state,
labelled “St. 1”, is the state of Schleswig-Holstein; the second state, labelled “St. 2”, is the
state of North Rhine-Westphalia).24
Again, we can make three observations. First, irrespective of whether we plot the overall
mean for groups of states pooled together or separately for single states, there is a common
trend between these states before the first observations of the treated become available. Sec-
ond, the interview year before the first observations of the treated become available marks a
structural break. Finally, after this structural break, these states once again exhibit common
trend behaviour.25
Taken together, the balancing properties of observables and the graphical evidence is clearly
supportive of a common trend between treatment and control group. Moreover, in case there is
unobserved heterogeneity, there seems to be a balance in unobservable characteristics between
them that remains constant over time.
24Again, see Figure W.3 in the Web Appendix for a similar illustration of political interest.
25The latter point is also suggestive evidence that the stable unit treatment value assumption is likely to hold:
common trend behaviour post-treatment implies that treatment intensity is likely to be the same across states.
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4. Results
4.1. Baseline Results
We now turn to our baseline results in Table A.2: column (1) includes only the reform dummy
variable, our regressor of interest; columns (2) and (3) then successively add age and a gradu-
ation dummy variable in order to account for age and graduation effects. Finally, column (4)
includes all of the above, along with a rich set of other demographic and parental household
characteristics; it is our preferred specification, and the regression equivalent to Figure A.4.26
Volunteering
Table A.2 shows that the reform has a negative and sizeable effect on volunteering across the
board, which is significant at the 1% level: in our preferred specification, it decreases the
likelihood to volunteer at least once a month by about six percentage points. The size of
this effect is also economically significant: given that almost 34 percent of all students in the
sample report to volunteer at least monthly, it amounts to a decrease of about 19 percent in this
share. In other words, the reform led almost every fifth student to change her behaviour from
volunteering at least monthly to volunteering less often or not at all. The fact that the sign,
size, and significance level is similar across all models reinforces the notion of a quasi-natural
experiment.27
Another way to look at this result is through the lens of an event study. Figure A.8 plots
the fitted annual mean of volunteering alongside 99% confidence intervals in the years just
before and the years just after the implementation of the reform (which varies by federal state),
whereby the year of implementation is normalised to be at t = 0. As can be seen, in the years
running up to the reform, the share of students who volunteer at least once a month follows a
rather stable path, averaging between 41% and 38%. In the year of implementation, at t = 0,
this share falls sharply to about 34%, and remains stable at a lower endline level in the ensuing
years.
26See Table W.3 in the Web Appendix for the full set of controls.
27This is suggestive evidence that ignorability is likely to hold, even unconditionally: the fact that our estimates
vary so little depending on covariates implies that treatment is likely to be exogenous.
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As our outcome is a binary indicator constructed from a categorical variable, it would be
interesting to see how the overall frequency distribution of volunteering changes due to the
reform. Figure A.7 illustrates this: it compares the means of the different frequencies of volun-
teering before and after the reform.
We can make three observations. First, the reform affects the entire frequency distribution
of volunteering, as all categories are affected, although to different degrees. Second, the driving
force behind the decrease in the share of students who volunteer at least once a month are
students who volunteer weekly, followed by those that volunteer monthly: the share of the
former drops by about 25%, the share of the latter by about 14%. On the contrary, the share
of students who report the highest frequency of volunteering sees almost no reduction (about
10%). This, however, is only a small fraction: about 5% report to volunteer daily, as opposed
to about 16% and 12% reporting to volunteer weekly and monthly, respectively. Second, these
reductions are met with rises by about 13% and 7%, respectively, in the share of students who
volunteer less often and the share of students who volunteer never; the difference between these
flows is significant. This implies that the reform affected both the intensive and the extensive
margin of volunteering: while some students (about two thirds) cut back on their activities,
others (about one third) gave them up completely, which is broadly in line with the results
obtained for the double graduation cohort in the federal state of Saxony-Anhalt by Meyer and
Thomsen (2015). At the same time, this might point towards potential effect heterogeneities,
and indeed, although we find little evidence that the effects vary much by student demographics
and achievement, we find, in line with evidence from other OECD countries (OECD, 2015),
that students from disadvantaged backgrounds – defined here as students with at least one
parent being a blue-collar worker – are slightly more likely to cut back on their activities (see
Table W.4 for this result).
The question arises whether there is a similar crowding out of scholastic involvement as
for volunteering. Alternatively, one could ask whether the crowding out of volunteering is
matched by an increase in scholastic involvement. In other words, is there a substitution of
activities outside school with activities inside? Table A.3 shows that neither is the case: it
takes our preferred specification, column (4) in Table A.2, and uses the likelihood of various
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ways of scholastic involvement as outcomes. Clearly, the reform has no significant effect on
any of them, and neither is there a clear pattern in terms of sign. To get a sense of whether
the reform affects the extensive margin of scholastic involvement, we also tested an alternative
outcome: a binary indicator that equals one if respondents have ever been engaged in any of
the activities in columns (a) to (g), and zero else. Again, the reform has no significant effect
on this alternative outcome (not shown).28 A potential caveat of this analysis is that we have
slightly fewer observations for scholastic involvement than for volunteering: the sample size
decreases from 2,240 to 1,958 students. This decrease, however, is mostly driven by students
in the control group: 936 are now in the treatment and 1,022 are in the control group.
Political Interest
Finally, we ask how the reform affects political interest, which we take as a proxy for political
behaviour. Table A.4 sheds light on this question. Once again, we take our preferred spec-
ification, column (4) in Table A.2, and use the likelihood of being interested in politics with
a particular strength, including strongly, fairly, weakly, or not at all, as outcomes. We also
combine the first two categories to form a new one, namely being moderately interested in
politics.29
Interestingly, we find that the reform has a differential impact on political interest: it has
a significantly positive effect on being weakly interested at the 5% level. At the same time,
however, it has a significantly negative effect on not being interested at all as well as on being
moderately interested at the 5% level.30 In other words, there is a depolarisation at both ends
of the spectrum: the reform decreases the share of students who report to be moderately, that
is, at least fairly, interested in politics by about 11 percentage points while at the same time
decreasing the share that report to be not interested at all by about six percentage points. Taken
28In another specification, we excluded the activities in columns (a) and (b). Arguably, these activities should
react inelastically to changes in instructional time: by German school law, there has to be a student and a class
representative. The result, however, remains the same.
29In this analysis, we have slightly more observations: the sample size increases from 2,240 to 2,536, 1,000 of
which are now in the treatment and 1,536 are in the control group.
30See Table W.5 in the Web Appendix for the result on being moderately interested in politics.
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together, this equals the incremental 17 percentage points of those being weakly interested.
These migration flows are very strong: every third student switches from the higher category
to the lower, and vice versa.31 We find no effect heterogeneities with respect to student socio-
demographics and achievement.
A potential explanation for this differential impact on political interest is that the reform
crowds out political interest on one side of the spectrum, namely for those already interested in
politics, while at the same time encouraging others on the other side to become politically ac-
tive, especially those who have not been so previously, for example, by joining a protest group
or party that opposes the reform. In fact, the reform has sparked considerable controversy
amongst students, parents, and educators alike (some in anticipation of the adverse effects pre-
sented in this study), and continues to do so today. This has led some federal states to announce
its revocation, and others like the federal state of Rhineland-Palatine not to implement it in the
first place.
Channel
The reform has reduced the number of school years in high school from nine to eight, while
leaving the taught curriculum and all other inputs into the educational production function
constant. There are two potential ways to implement such a reform: the first is to leave the total
number of weekly instructional hours constant and go through the curriculum at a faster pace,
the second to append more weekly instructional hours and go through the curriculum at the
same pace. The question now is whether the identified effects are driven by an increase in the
intensity of instruction (the former) or a decrease in the availability of leisure time (the latter).
The guidelines for the implementation of the reform and the available evidence so far suggests
that the number of weekly instructional hours has indeed increased, thus decreasing the number
of weekly leisure hours (Homuth, 2017). A reduction in the number of weekly leisure hours has
then, potentially, decreased the time available for volunteering activities. How can we provide
more evidence for this channel?
One way to do this is to standardise our primary outcome – volunteering at least monthly
– by the available leisure time per month: 24×7 week hours in total minus about 5×6 week
hours in school under the old regime equals 138 hours in available leisure time per week or
31In unreported robustness checks, we include dummy variables for state, federal, and European elections,
either individually or jointly: the results remain robust, and are available upon request.
18
552 hours per month; 24× 7 week hours in total minus about 5× 7 week hours in school
under the new regime equals 133 hours in available leisure time per week or 532 hours per
month.32 The first column of Table A.5 uses our preferred specification, column (4) in Table
A.2, with volunteering at least monthly standardised by the available leisure time per month
as outcome: as expected, the coefficient is significant but greatly attenuated, suggesting indeed
that the identified effects are driven by a decrease in the availability of leisure time.33 This
is also corroborated by the fact that, in our preferred specification, the likelihood to volunteer
at least monthly decreases by about 19 percent as the number of weekly instructional hours
increases by about 13 percent – an almost linear relationship.
Another piece of evidence comes from subjective well-being data: the second column of
Table A.5 uses our preferred specification, column (4) in Table A.2, with self-reported life
satisfaction as outcome. As can be seen, the reform has no significant impact on this evaluative
measure of subjective well-being. Arguably, an increase in the intensity of instruction may raise
stress levels, everything else held constant, which may lead to lower levels of subjective well-
being. The non-finding may suggest that, although the reform has reduced the available leisure
time of students, in order to remain on the same welfare level, students may have responded by
reducing their commitment to leisure activities, which, in turn, may have alleviated their stress
levels.
4.2. Robustness Checks
In the following, we conduct a number of robustness checks to confirm the robustness of our
baseline results. Specifically, we test whether they remain robust to a different model specifi-
cation, time trends, and seasonal variation; selection and implementation; triple differencing;
and potentially confounding other reforms that are implemented during the observation period.
We also conduct a series of placebo tests. All robustness checks build on our preferred speci-
fication, column (4) in Table A.2. For the sake of brevity, we focus on volunteering, our main
32Implicitly, this accounts for sleeping time as there could, hypothetically, be substitution effects with sleep.
33Note that standardisation by available leisure time introduces measurement error: if a respondent indicates to
volunteer weekly, this could mean that she volunteers once a week up to, theoretically, six times a week, given
that the next higher category is to volunteer daily (at, on average, more than 3.5 volunteering events per week the
respondent might indicate to volunteer daily). The same holds true for volunteering monthly. At the same time,
there is only a very small share of students who volunteer daily (they are also the least affected), which would be
the most precise measure.
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variable of interest.
Model Specification, Time Trends, and Seasonal Variation
First, we turn to a different model specification. In column (1) of Table A.6, we use a probit
instead of a linear model. As can be seen, the reform still has a negative effect on volunteering,
which is significant at the 1% level. The size of the coefficient, however, is slightly larger.
Figure A.4 suggests that some of the decline in volunteering during the observation period
probably would have come about in the absence of the reform, which raises the question to
what extent the identified reform effect is driven by time trends. To be clear, this is not a threat
to our identification strategy as long as time trends do not affect treatment and control group
differentially, and time trends are not correlated with the outcome. To explore this possibility
nevertheless, in columns (2) and (3) of Table A.6, we include a linear and quadratic time trend,
respectively. Then, in column (4), we include both of them at the same time. As can be seen, the
reform still has a negative effect on volunteering, which is significant at the 1% level, across
all models, and the size of the coefficients is very similar. We go even one step further: in
column (5), we include both state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, counting up the
years for each state individually, and in column (6), we include both treatment-specific linear
and quadratic time trends, counting up the years for each state individually starting from the
interview year in which the first observations of the treated amongst the interviewed become
available. Arguably, both specifications are very restrictive in the sense that they take out much
variation in the data, which is in part reflected by lower significance levels. The point estimates
remain, nevertheless, quite robust.
Finally, we turn to seasonal variation. Again, this is not a threat to our identification strategy
as long as treatment and control group are not systematically interviewed at different dates, and
interview dates are not correlated with the outcome. To explore this possibility nevertheless, in
columns (7) and (8) of Table A.6, we include quarterly and monthly dummy variables, respec-
tively. As expected, the sign, size, and significance level of the reform effect in both models is
very similar to that in our preferred specification.34
34One might argue that, at the time of interview, students in the treatment group are relatively closer to their
high school finals than those in the control group, which might, in turn, partially or even fully account for the
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Selection and Implementation
Next, we turn to selection, which may come in two flavours: within-sample and out-of-sample
selection. First, students may self-select from the treatment into the control group within the
sample, for example, by moving from one federal state to another in order to avoid the reform.35
Alternatively, students may self-select out of the sample altogether, for example, by dropping
out of high school. To be clear, this is not a threat to our identification strategy as long as self-
selection is not correlated with the outcome. Assuming that students who move or drop out are
those who are most adversely affected by the reform, our estimates are downward biased and
can be interpreted as a lower bound.
We believe that within-sample selection is unlikely to be an issue: moving from one federal
state to another is associated with high monetary and non-monetary costs for both students and
parents. Besides, geographic mobility in Germany is traditionally low: in a given year, only
about 6% of respondents in the SOEP move. This is even more so the case in a selective sample
like ours, comprising families with children that attend high school: in a given year, only about
3% of them move. Nevertheless, in column (1) of Table A.7, we evaluate how movers affect
our estimates: here, we exclude all students who move during the observation period. As it
turns out, this does not change our estimates much: the reform still has a negative effect on
volunteering, which is significant at the 1% level; the size of the effect is somewhat reduced.36
A more serious problem arises, however, for students living close to a state border: rather than
move to avoid the reform, they may transfer to a school in a neighbouring state that has not
yet implemented it, and commute. In column (2) of Table A.7, we exclude all students who
live within a 10km radius to a state border (about 27%).37 As it turns out, the size of the effect
becomes larger, presumably since some of these students are allocated to the treatment group
identified reform effect. To rule out this non-random measurement error, we followed the approach by Dahmann
and Anger (2014), restricting our sample to students aged 17 and interacting our main effect with monthly dummy
variables. We do not find a clear pattern in terms of sign, size, and significance level for these interactions; the
point estimate of the main effect remains robust, but its significance is greatly reduced, most likely due to loss of
observations (about a quarter of our sample). We take this as evidence that non-random measurement error due to
time of interview is, if anything, a minor issue.
35Implicitly, we assume that students self-select from the treatment into the control group, as they have a
preference to avoid the reform. To be more precise, it is unlikely that students themselves self-select; rather, it is
their parents who – probably after joint decision-making with their children – decide on taking this action. For
simplicity, we refer to students throughout.
36In column (a) of Table W.7 in the Web Appendix, we regress the probability of moving on the reform: the
effect is small and insignificant. We take this as evidence that the reform has no effect on moving behaviour per
se.
37Similar results are obtained when using a 20km or a 30km radius.
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although, in fact, they should be allocated to the control group.38
Rather than geographically sorting between schools, students may also sort within them, for
example, by skipping a grade in order to avoid the reform. Unfortunately, we do not have infor-
mation on whether a student skipped a grade. We argue, however, that sorting within schools
is more of a theoretical problem for three reasons: first, skipping a grade is not entirely discre-
tionary to students, and requires considerable effort in terms of previous academic achievement.
Second, those students who are allowed to skip a grade are presumably those that are the least
affected by the reform, and thus have the lowest incentive to avoid it. Finally, skipping a grade
leads students to graduate in the same cohort as their former peers, which – in terms of time
to graduation – has no advantage. Moreover, as we argue below, this double cohort has cer-
tain features that render grade-skipping to avoid the reform an unattractive strategy. Related,
students may also sort within schools by repeating a grade. Although this is not a feasible
strategy to avoid the reform, it could nevertheless affect our estimates, as students could switch
from the control to the treatment group. Assuming that students who must repeat a grade under
the old regime are likely to struggle even more under the new one, omitting them would bias
our estimates downwards. Again, this issue applies only to a small subset of students, namely
those that are in the last pre-treatment cohorts preceding the first treatment ones. Nevertheless,
in column (3) of Table A.7, we dig deeper into this issue: here, we exclude all students who
repeat a grade (about 7%). We find that the reform still has a negative effect on volunteering,
which is significant at the 1% level. As expected, the size of the effect is somewhat reduced.39
Finally, we turn to out-of-sample selection: clearly, if dropping out of high school were a
deliberate strategy to avoid the reform, it would be the one with the highest opportunity costs,
as students would effectively forego their university entrance qualification. In column (4) of
Table A.7, we evaluate how drop-outs affect our estimates: here, we exclude all students who
drop out of high school (about 8%). As it turns out, the sign, size, and significance level of the
38Related, a staggered self-selection of federal states is also thinkable: first, they decide on whether to im-
plement the reform or not; then, they decide on when to implement it. Again, as long as self-selection is not
correlated with the outcome, this does not threaten our identification strategy. Moreover, Dahmann and Anger
(2014) convincingly show that federal states which implement the reform early do not systematically differ from
those that do so late regarding their proportion of high school students, governing party, next election date, and
GDP per capita.
39As with moving, in column (b) of Table W.7 in the Web Appendix, we regress the probability of repeating a
grade on the reform: the effect is small and insignificant.
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effect is very similar to that in our preferred specification.40
Although the reform has been swiftly integrated into the German secondary education land-
scape, there may have been various implementation effects – confounding one-off effects aris-
ing from the implementation of the reform into regular school business. This is particularly true
for students in double, first treatment, and last pre-treatment cohorts, across all federal states.41
Moreover, in the federal states of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, students
in the first treatment cohorts had already started school when the reform was implemented.
For example, for students in the double cohort, such implementation effects may be due to
increased competition for secondary and post-secondary educational resources; for students in
the first treatment cohort, they may be due to inexperience of teachers, or insecurity on side of
students; and for students in the last pre-treatment cohort, they may be due to increased motiva-
tion not to repeat a grade, and be affected by the reform. On the other hand, teachers may treat
students in these cohorts in a more easy way. Although it is unlikely that such implementation
effects are the driving force behind the aggregate effect, they can still affect our estimates.
In columns (5) to (8) of Table A.7, we explore this possibility in more detail: here, we
include state-specific controls individually for students in double, first treatment, and last pre-
treatment cohorts, as well as for students in the first treatment cohorts in the federal states
of Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. If anything, we find that controlling for
cohorts that might suffer from implementation effects slightly increases the aggregate effect in
our preferred specification. Confounding implementation effects, therefore, seem to be less of
an issue.42
Triple Differencing
Recall that our difference-in-differences design is both generalised and pseudo: generalised in
the sense that treatment can occur at different points in time for different students, pseudo in the
sense that each student is observed only once. One implication of this design is that students
40Once again, in column (c) of Table W.7 in the Web Appendix, we regress the probability of dropping out on
the reform: the effect is small and insignificant. We take this as evidence that the reform has no effect on drop-out
behaviour. This is in line with Huebener and Marcus (2015) who find that the reform does not affect drop-out
rates.
41We define the first treatment cohorts as the cohorts succeeding the double cohorts in order to avoid mixing up
implementation effects.
42In column (3) of Table W.6 in the Web Appendix, we go even one step further and control for all cohorts that
might suffer from implementation effects at the same time: the results remain the same.
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who are affected by the reform are observed towards the end and students who are not affected
towards the beginning of the observation period, each only once. This means that, at each point
in time, students who are treated earlier are compared with students who are treated later. At
the end, all students are treated.
Although there is evidence that federal states which implement the reform early do not sys-
tematically differ from those that do so late (see Dahmann and Anger (2014), for example) and
that time trends play only a minor role, students who are interviewed towards the beginning
may still systematically differ from those who are interviewed towards the end of the obser-
vation period. To alleviate such concerns, we follow Quis and Reif (2017) and use a triple
differencing design as a robustness check. More specifically, we exploit the fact that the reform
affected only students in the upper track by employing students in the other tracks as a clean
control group. This boils down to the following specification:
yisc,(17−20) = β0 +β1(Re f ormsc×G)+β ′2Xisc,(17−20)+β3G+
+(
16
∑
s=1
γsStates×G)+(
14
∑
c=1
δcCohortc×G)+ εisc,(17−20) (2)
where G is a dummy variable that equals one if the student belongs to the upper track, and
zero else. The remaining coefficients are the same as before.
Table A.8 takes our preferred specification, column (4) in Table A.2, and adds this addi-
tional stage of differencing: as can be seen, the reform still has a significant, negative impact
on volunteering. The size of the effect is larger, and significance somewhat reduced.
Other Reforms
Over the past two decades, there have been various other reforms in the German secondary
education landscape, some of which fall into the observation period, and could potentially be
confounding.43 For example, having long been standard in the majority of states, the remain-
der has only recently moved towards state-wide harmonised high school finals by introducing
central exit examinations. Others, trying to open up the traditionally less permeable and rigid
43See Huebener and Marcus (2015) for a detailed overview of these reforms.
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German education system, introduced changes to the grade at which tracking takes place, or
reduced tracking altogether by combining the lower and intermediate tracks into a single one.
Yet others have introduced changes to the choice of subjects available to high school seniors.
Probably the biggest change in recent decades, however, has been the abolishment of manda-
tory military or civil service right after finishing secondary education: in 2011, it was replaced
with the (non-mandatory) Federal Volunteer Service.
To be clear, it is unlikely that any of these reforms systematically biases our estimates for
two reasons: first, it would have to be correlated with the outcome. More importantly, however,
it would have to affect treatment and control group differentially. This would be the case if
reforms were correlated, for example, if reducing the number of years required to obtain a high
school degree went hand in hand with restricting the subject choice available to high school
seniors. Alternatively, one could argue that states which are more prone to reform may be the
first to reduce the number of high school years, and may also be inclined to introduce other
reforms shortly after, or the other way around.
To rule out this possibility, in columns (1) to (5) of Table A.9, we include state-time-specific
controls for these potentially confounding other reforms. As expected, the sign, size, and signif-
icance level of the coefficients is very similar to that in our preferred specification. Likewise,
excluding students who have already graduated, and who might thus be participating in the
Federal Volunteer Service, leaves results unchanged (not shown). Confounding other reforms,
therefore, seem to be less of an issue.44
Placebo Tests
Finally, as a last exercise, we conduct placebo tests: in columns (1) and (2) of Table A.10, we
lag the first treatment cohort by one and two, respectively; in columns (3) and (4), we ran-
domly allocate treatment status to school cohorts and federal states, respectively, keeping the
other constant. Finally, in column (5), we completely perturb both school cohorts and federal
states, and then randomly allocate treatment status. As can be seen, none of the coefficients is
significant at any conventional level. For the first two columns, we can see that the coefficients
44In column (4) of Table W.6 in the Web Appendix, we go even one step further and control for all potentially
confounding reforms at the same time: the results remain the same.
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are negative, pointing towards the overall trend reversal in volunteering we see during the ob-
servation period; the fact that the coefficient of the second column is slightly larger than that of
the first one suggests that there are no ex-ante behavioural changes due to anticipation effects
(Ashenfelter’s dip). Note that in both of these columns, we lose observations that fall out of
the observation period window. For the last three columns, we cannot observe a clear pattern
of coefficients.
5. Discussion and Policy Implications
We find robust empirical evidence that raising instructional time has the potential to signifi-
cantly affect student leisure activities and behaviours, and in particular, to significantly crowd
out student pro-social behaviour, a behaviour that is linked to various positive outcomes – both
at the societal and individual level – and that parents, educators, and policy-makers alike would
otherwise consider worth promoting. In the given context, a rise in weekly instructional hours
of about 13% had a negative and sizeable effect on volunteering, reducing the share of students
who volunteer at least once a month by about 19 percent. In other words, it led almost every fifth
student to change her behaviour from volunteering at least monthly to volunteering less often
or not at all. Students who volunteer on a regular basis are most adversely affected, and there is
some evidence that those from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to disengage. While
two thirds of students cut back on their activities, one third give them up completely. We find
no similar crowding out of involvement in activities within school, but no substitution either.
Finally, there is evidence that raising instructional time also has the potential to affect political
interest, which we take as a proxy for political behaviour.
Probably the most important remaining question, especially from a policy perspective, is
whether the identified effects are permanent or temporary. The fact that impacts seem to be
driven by a reduction in available leisure time as opposed to a rise in intensity of instruction
may already point into the direction of temporary effects: once students graduate and more
leisure time becomes available, we would expect that they – at least temporarily – return to
their baseline level of volunteering, or even exceed it. To put this to a more formal test, we
compare the raw mean levels of volunteering, our main outcome, for students in the treatment
group with those in the control group, respectively, before and after graduation: as expected,
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for students in the control group, we observe only a small change in volunteering levels after
graduating, from a share of about 36% to 39%; for students in the treatment group, however,
we observe a pronounced change, from a share of about 30% to 40%, or in other words, from a
lower baseline level to about the same level as the control group. One caveat of this tabulation
is that sample size reduces quite drastically for post-graduation raw means: for students in the
treatment group, there are only ten observations left (for students in the control group, there are
76). Extending our tabulation to include individuals not used in our regressions (i.e. individuals
with missings on observables) leads to similar raw mean levels of volunteering for students in
the control group (37% pre-graduation and 39% post-graduation), but quite different ones for
students in the treatment group: here, the share of students who volunteer at least monthly
increases from about 32% pre-graduation to 48% post-graduation, suggesting that students
may more than offset a lack of volunteering during school.45 This is in line with Meyer and
Thomsen (2015) who find that, for students affected by the reform, university enrolment in
the year of graduation decreases while participation in voluntary service or staying abroad
increases. Taken together, these results suggest that the identified effects are only temporary.
Why are our findings important? First of all, in the given context, they are important be-
cause of the large number of students affected. In Germany, in school year 2014/15 alone, of
2,329,990 high school students in total (Federal Statistical Office, 2016b), about 785,000 vol-
unteered at least monthly. We estimate that the rise in instructional time decreases this share
by about 149,000: 99,000 cut back on their activities, and 50,000 give them up completely. It
is difficult to measure the economic value of volunteering for society: there exist various defi-
nitions of volunteering, and at least as many ways to measure it, for example through national
accounts, labour force surveys, or social and time use surveys. It is clear, however, that this
value is substantial.46 Through time use surveys, the OECD estimates the economic value of
volunteering for Germany in 2013 to be around USD 117.6 billion or 3.3% of real GDP (OECD,
2015).47 We can calculate back-of-the-envelope that losing between 50,000 and 149,000 vol-
unteers is equal to losing volunteer work worth between USD 71.5 million and USD 213.2
million.48 These figures are likely to be lower bounds for two reasons: first, volunteering in the
45In this tabulation, sample size for students in the post-graduation treatment group increases from ten to 202.
46See The Economist (2014) for a recent feature.
47This figure is roughly comparable to the UK (2.5%) and to the US (3.7%).
48There were 82.2 million people living in Germany in 2015 (Federal Statistical Office, 2016a). Thus, assum-
ing the distribution of activities in the general population is similar to that in the population under scrutiny, the
loss in volunteer work can be calculated as (117,600,000,000× 50,000)/82,200,000 and (117,600,000,000×
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general population is less prevalent than in the population under scrutiny.49 Second, to the ex-
tent that volunteering during youth and adolescence contributes to habit formation (Hart et al.,
2007) and has positive peer effects (Wilson and Musick, 1997), impacts may be permanent
rather than temporary. The available, tentative evidence so far, however, suggests that this is
rather not the case, but this point warrants further investigation.
Besides negative effects for society per se, the decrease in volunteer work can also have
negative micro implications: a growing body of evidence documents the importance of volun-
teering for individual labour market outcomes. For example, in a recent correspondence testing
study, Baert and Vujic´ (2016) show that job seekers who indicate volunteering on their resumes
receive one third more interview invitations, and that this volunteering premium is higher for
women. A leading professional social network, LinkedIn (2016), using data on members, esti-
mates that one in five managers hire someone because of their volunteering experience. Sauer
(2015), using a structural model and longitudinal data for the US, estimates that an extra year
of pro-social engagement increases wage offers in future full-time (part-time) work by 2.6%
(8.5%) for women aged 25 to 55, in line with Freeman (1997) who estimates that volunteer-
ing raises paid work hours by between 3% and 7%. Remarkably similar, using a Mincerian
earnings regression with Heckman’s two-step procedure to correct for self-selection into em-
ployment, we regress monthly net individual income at age 24 to 33 on volunteering at age 17,
and find that volunteering in youth is associated with higher earnings in adulthood of about
7% (results available upon request).50 There is evidence that being engaged from an early age
149,000)/82,200,000, respectively, for the 50,000 students giving up and for the 149,000 students cutting back
and giving up their activities.
49In the general population, only about 23% of individuals report to volunteer at least once a month, according
to the OECD. In the SOEP, this share is even lower: 20%. Again, both figures are roughly comparable to the UK
(18%) and to the US (30%).
50We estimate the following Mincerian earnings regression:
ln(yi,(24−33)) = β0 +β1Volunteeringi,17 +β
′
2Xi,(24−33)+µ ˆλi,(24−33)+ εi,(24−33)
where y is the log monthly net individual income of individual i, measured at age 24 to 33, and X is a vector of
controls, including dummy variables for age, gender, marital status (single, partnered, or married), educational at-
tainment (secondary or tertiary degree), employment status (in training, full-time employed, part-time employed,
irregularly employed, on parental leave, or unemployed). The age interval is determined by two factors: the upper
bound is determined by data availability (volunteering at age 17 is only available for a limited number of indi-
viduals), the lower bound by the average age of entry into the labour force of students with a first professional
qualification. ˆλi,(24−33) =
φ(z′iγ)
Φ(z′iγ)
is the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from an auxiliary probit regression that esti-
mates whether an individual works or not. Our regressor of interest is β1, which measures the percentage change
in adult earnings due to youth volunteering.
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on enhances psychological development by raising self-esteem and self-confidence and by dis-
couraging risky behaviours (Hart et al., 2007; Wilson and Musick, 2012). The physical and
mental health benefits of volunteering (Wilson and Musick, 2012), as well as its subjective
well-being returns are well documented (Binder and Freytag, 2013; Borgnonovi, 2008; Meier
and Stutzer, 2008). Finally, to the extent that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are dis-
proportionally affected, the role that volunteering can play in the production process of skills,
for example, through generating early life skills that complement other skills later on (Cunha
and Heckman, 2007; Fuchs, 2016), or in the selection process for further education, as is for ex-
ample the case in the German scholarship system or for admissions to US colleges, the decrease
in volunteering for these groups might further increase educational inequalities.51
Raising instructional time is often found to have positive impacts on student learning and
performance, especially when the additional time is used effectively, and there surely is an op-
timal amount of weekly instructional hours that balances student learning with student leisure
activities and behaviours. For a complete cost-benefit account of raising instructional time,
however, its impacts on student leisure activities and behaviours, in particular on beneficial
behaviours such as volunteering, should be taken into account. In view of our findings, educa-
tion policy could consider lowering access barriers to volunteering. In particular, given that we
do not find a similar crowding out of involvement in activities within school as for volunteer-
ing outside school, it could provide alternative activities for volunteering such as high school
community service within schools, or encourage it through the curriculum, for example, by
introducing volunteering days.
There are many limitations to this study, which is only a cautious exploration into the re-
lationship between instructional time and student pro-social behaviour. The most obvious is
that we can only present tentative results on how persistent the identified effects are. The fact
that raw mean levels of volunteering of affected students converge to, or even exceed, those of
unaffected students, however, suggests that they are only temporary. Once more data become
available, it would be interesting to test this more formally. Moreover, in unreported regres-
sions, we do not find that raising instructional time crowds out other student leisure activities
and behaviours such as playing music or doing sports, and an obvious question would be why
51See The Behavioural Insights Team (2016) for a recent impact evaluation of programmes that promote social
action: it shows that such programmes can nurture skills such as empathy or grit that are critical for educational
success.
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volunteering, in particular, is affected. Access barriers might play a role here. Finally, external
validity is an issue. The fact that the UK and the US exhibit similar profiles regarding instruc-
tional time and volunteering demographics than Germany (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015;
OECD, 2015), however, might point towards the fact that findings are rather transferable.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Implementation of Reform, Variation Across States and Over Time
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Note: The figure shows variation in the implementation of the reform across states and over time.
It also reports the shares of students in the different tracks for each state, as of school year 2014/15.
The category multiple tracks includes students in schools combining the intermediate and lower track;
other includes students in comprehensive and Waldorf schools.
The states are Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW), Bavaria (BY), Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BB),
Bremen (HB), Hamburg (HH), Hesse (HE), Lower Saxony (NI), Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MV),
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP), Saarland (SL), Saxony (SN),
Saxony-Anhalt (ST), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), and Thuringia (TH).
Sources: Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy (2016), Federal Statistical Office (2016b),
Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (2016), own calculations
Pro-Social Behaviour
Figure A.2: Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Over Time
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Graphical Evidence
Figure A.3: Graphical Evidence - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Over Time, 1 of 2
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure A.4: Graphical Evidence - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Over Time, 2 of 2
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure A.5: Graphical Evidence - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Common Trend, 1 of 2
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Gr. 1 includes the federal states of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hesse, and Lower Saxony.
Gr. 2 includes the federal states of Berlin, Brandenburg, and Schleswig-Holstein.
Volunteering
Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure A.6: Graphical Evidence - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Common Trend, 2 of 2
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St. 1 is the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.
St. 2 is the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Volunteering
Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure A.7: Baseline Results - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Event Study
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure A.8: Baseline Results - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School, Change in Distribution
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of volunteering serves as the outcome. The regressions routinely control for demographic,
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See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
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Baseline Results
Table A.2: Baseline Results - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform -0.0728*** -0.0658*** -0.0657*** -0.0642***
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0168)
Age 18 0.0386 0.0382 0.0368
(0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0341)
Age 19 0.0885* 0.0846* 0.0858*
(0.0420) (0.0425) (0.0427)
Age 20 0.0593 0.0410 0.0413
(0.0495) (0.0530) (0.0468)
Has Graduated -0.0437 -0.0500*
(0.0254) (0.0267)
Other Demographic Characteristics No No No Yes
Parental Characteristics No No No Yes
Household Characteristics No No No Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0534 0.0555 0.0557 0.0776
Adjusted R2 0.0327 0.0335 0.0333 0.0513
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
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Table A.4: Baseline Results - Political Interest
Political Interest
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d)
Reform -0.0336 -0.0733 0.1651** -0.0582**
(0.0311) (0.0475) (0.0597) (0.0251)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,536 2,536 2,536 2,536
R2 0.0518 0.0635 0.0526 0.0605
Adjusted R2 0.0272 0.0393 0.0281 0.0361
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(a) Strong, (b) Fair, (c) Weak, (d) None
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full
set of federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are
rounded to four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2000-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20,
own calculations
Table A.5: Baseline Results - Channel
Regressors Volunteering, Standardised b Life Satisfaction
Reform -0.0001*** 0.2618
(0.0000) (0.1515)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,544
R2 0.0761 0.0422
Adjusted R2 0.0498 0.0174
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
b Standardisation by available leisure time per month
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
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Table A.8: Robustness Checks 3 of 5 (Triple Differencing) - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Regressors Volunteering
Reform -0.1120**
(0.0418)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes
Household Characteristics Yes
Number of Observations 4,716
R2 0.0739
Adjusted R2 0.0545
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables, both interacted with
a dummy variable for academic-track students and non-interacted.
All figures are rounded to four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (different tracks) aged 17 to 20,
own calculations
Table A.9: Robustness Checks 4 of 5 (Other Reforms) - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform -0.0617*** -0.0609** -0.0634*** -0.0641*** -0.0604***
(0.0169) (0.0212) (0.0167) (0.0157) (0.0191)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0777 0.0777 0.0777 0.0776 0.0784
Adjusted R2 0.0510 0.0510 0.0510 0.0509 0.0518
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(1) Includes Dummy Variable for Changes in Central Exit Examinations,
(2) Includes Dummy Variable for Changes in Tracking at Grade Seven,
(3) Includes Dummy Variable for Changes in Two-Tier System,
(4) Includes Dummy Variable for Changes in Subject Choice,
(5) Includes Dummy Variable for Federal Volunteer Service
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of federal state
and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Table A.10: Robustness Checks 5 of 5 (Placebo Tests) - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform -0.0147 -0.0301 -0.0421 0.0122 0.0275
(0.0317) (0.0394) (0.0298) (0.0225) (0.0296)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,217 2,204 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0792 0.0788 0.0783 0.0780 0.0776
Adjusted R2 0.0527 0.0521 0.0520 0.0510 0.0513
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(1) Placebo School Cohorts (c-1), (2) Placebo School Cohorts (c-2),
(3) Placebo School Cohorts (Random), (4) Placebo Federal States (Random),
(5) Placebo School Cohorts and Federal States (Random)
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Web Appendix
Figure W.1: Graphical Evidence - Volunteering, Over Time
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of volunteering, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (lower and intermediate track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure W.2: Graphical Evidence - Political Interest, Over Time
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Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of political interest, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Figure W.3: Graphical Evidence - Political Interest, Common Trend
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St. 1 is the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.
St. 2 is the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Political Interest: Modest
Note: The figure shows the fitted annual mean of political interest, covariate-adjusted for demographic,
educational, and parental household characteristics, as well as for sub-samples and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
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Table W.2: Distribution of Students by Age in Treatment and Control Group for Volunteering Over Time
Treatment Group (n= 994) Control Group (n= 1,246)
Year Age 17 Age 18 Age 19 Age 20 Age 17 Age 18 Age 19 Age 20 Total
2001 0 0 0 0 71 89 78 72 310
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 25 20 34 25 104
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 102 10 4 4 120
2006 0 0 0 0 95 0 0 0 95
2007 0 0 0 0 130 15 17 5 167
2008 1 0 0 0 84 8 3 0 96
2009 4 0 0 0 96 13 4 1 118
2010 47 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 128
2011 134 13 2 0 36 24 51 23 283
2012 165 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 173
2013 181 8 7 1 5 0 8 5 215
2014 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200
2015 189 16 18 8 0 0 0 0 231
Total 921 37 27 9 733 179 199 135 2,240
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Baseline Results
Table W.3: Baseline Results - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform -0.0728*** -0.0658*** -0.0657*** -0.0642***
(0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0168)
Age 18 0.0386 0.0382 0.0368
(0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0341)
Age 19 0.0885* 0.0846* 0.0858*
(0.0420) (0.0425) (0.0427)
Age 20 0.0593 0.0410 0.0413
(0.0495) (0.0530) (0.0468)
Has Graduated -0.0437 -0.0500*
(0.0254) (0.0267)
Is Female -0.0221
(0.0219)
Has Migration Background -0.0833*
(0.0395)
Lives in East -0.1885***
(0.0323)
Lives in Countryside 0.0007
(0.0235)
Parent Has Tertiary Degree 0.0562**
(0.0220)
Parent is Blue-Collar Worker -0.0753**
(0.0343)
Parent is Full-Time Employed 0.0078
(0.0168)
Parent is Single -0.0673***
(0.0201)
Is Only Child -0.0096
(0.0336)
Number of Children in Household 0.0223
(0.0130)
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0534 0.0555 0.0557 0.0776
Adjusted R2 0.0327 0.0335 0.0333 0.0513
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Table W.4: Heterogeneous Results - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d)
Reform × Column 0.1105* -0.0298 -0.0195*** 0.0371
(0.0520) (0.0925) (0.0597) (0.0486)
Reform -0.0844*** -0.0634*** -0.0817*** -0.0704*
(0.0192) (0.0131) (0.0152) (0.0366)
Column -0.1387** -0.0168 0.0138*** -0.1030**
(0.0489) (0.0765) (0.0421) (0.0391)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 1,709
R2 0.0795 0.0765 0.0797 0.0853
Adjusted R2 0.0528 0.0498 0.0589 0.0502
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(a) Has Migration Background, (b) Parent Has Lower Than Secondary Degree,
(c) Parent is Blue-Collar Worker, (d) Was not Recommended Upper Track
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Table W.5: Baseline Results - Political Interest
Political Interest
Regressors Modest
Reform -0.1069**
(0.0492)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes
Household Characteristics Yes
Number of Observations 2,536
R2 0.1015
Adjusted R2 0.0783
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2000-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20,
own calculations
Robustness Checks
Table W.6: Robustness Checks (1/2) - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Volunteering
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform -0.0720*** -0.0642*** -0.1614** -0.0530**
(0.0211) (0.0122) (0.0696) (0.0241)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0785 0.0776 0.0785 0.0786
Adjusted R2 0.0522 0.0513 0.0505 0.0502
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(1) Uses Weights,
(2) Uses Bootstrapped Standard Errors,
(3) Includes All Dummy Variables From 5 to 8 in Table A.7,
(4) Includes All Dummy Variables From 1 to 5 in Table A.9
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples, and a full set of
federal state and school cohort dummy variables. All figures are rounded to
four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track) aged 17 to 20, own calculations
Table W.7: Robustness Checks (2/2) - Pro-Social Behaviour, Outside of School
Probability
Regressors (a) (b) (c)
Reform 0.0222 0.0372 -0.0081
(0.0138) (0.0308) (0.0204)
Demographic Characteristics a Yes Yes Yes
Parental Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,240 2,240 2,240
R2 0.0526 0.0838 0.2913
Adjusted R2 0.0256 0.0578 0.2711
a Including Age 18, Age 19, Age 20, and Has Graduated
(a) Moving, (b) Repeating Grade, (c) Dropping Out
Robust standard errors clustered at the federal state level
in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All models include a constant, controls for sub-samples,
and a full set of federal state and cohort dummy variables.
All figures are rounded to four decimal places.
See Section 2.1 for a description of the variables used.
Source: SOEP, 2001-2015, students (upper track)
aged 17 to 20, own calculations
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